LatinAmericasNewRegionalArchitecture-SegmentedRegionalismorCooperativeRegionalGovernance

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Latin America’s New Regional Architecture: Segmented Regionalism or
Cooperative Regional Governance?
Detlef Nolte
[email protected]
DRAFT: Please do not cite without permission
Paper presented at the XXXI International Congress of the Latin American
Studies Association (LASA)
Washington D.C., May 29 – June 1, 2013
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Summary
This paper has two main objectives. First, in the context of a rising importance of
regions in world politics, it will analyze the current regional architecture in Latin
America – which is characterized by a proliferation of partially overlapping regional
and subregional organizations – and confront opposite views of this process. Some
authors postulate an exhaustion of integration in Latin America ending up in
segmented regionalism and hemispheric disintegration. Others stress a variable
geometry of integration that facilitates intraregional cooperation and minimizes the
risk of veto-players and zero-sum politics. This paper argues that the proliferation of
regional organizations leads to “institutional elasticity” and gives Latin American
governments more freedom of choice with regard to the topics, issues and modes of
regional and subregional cooperation, leading to a differentiated regional governance
architecture. This is illustrated by a summary look on regional trade and security
cooperation.
Second, this article argues in favor of an analytical approach that takes into account
the visions of actors reflected in regional projects. (Region is what actors make of it.)
The pitfalls of analyzing the Latin American regional architecture with a narrow
Eurocentric integration approach will be discussed. The proposal here is to broaden
the analytical focus and replace the analytical concept of regional integration with the
analytical concept of regional governance. Regional governance more adequately
captures and integrates different patterns of regional cooperation and different
regional projects that result in overlapping regional organizations. It also better
reflects the self-declared objectives and interests of Latin American governments.
Instead of looking at the proliferation of regional organizations from a perspective of
fragmentation, this paper contends that the focus should be redirected to
understanding how different regional organizations interact. The interaction patterns
can vary from symbiotic to cooperative or competitive regional governance. This
article closes with a brief discussion of the repercussions of the new regional
architecture for the inter-regional relations between Latin America and the EU.
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1. Regions, Regional Organizations and Regional Powers
Regions and regionalism have become an important feature of world politics in a
multipolar international system where the West is only one region of a “decentred
globalism” constituted of several regional cores and where emerging states seek to
influence the norms of global governance (Buzan 2011; Fawcett 2013: 12). In this
context, it becomes more important to understand how regions are politically
organized and governed.
While regions are porous social entities (Katzenstein 2005) open to external influence
through processes of norm diffusion or through the foreign policies of great powers,
local actors can use regional organizations to create rules with a view to protecting
their autonomy from dominance or abuse by more powerful actors (Acharya 2011).
Regional organizations can make a region less porous in regard to the international
system by functioning as filters between the region and the international system
(including global governance structures).
The creation of regional organizations constitutes and consolidates a region
inasmuch as they give the region an identity (or “actorness”) as a social construct. As
former Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim (2010: 229–230) once claimed,
“Unasul [UNASUR] has given South America a face.”
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Moreover, regional
organizations delimit the region as a subsystem within the international system and
serve to structure the relations between states within the region. From this
perspective, there are two addressees of regional organizations. Regional
organizations deal with the management of regional externalities (that could be
related to trade, security or other topics) and/or with the articulation of common
interests of the region with regard to actors outside of the region. Regional
organizations, at the same time, separate the region as a subsystem from the
international system and structure the relations between states within the region. The
same institutions can be used as instruments of regional cooperation and as
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This identity-constructing function of regional organizations is well expressed in the
UNASUR treaty: “Member states will reinforce the practice of constructing consensus with
regard to the central topics of the international agenda and promote initiatives that affirm the
identity of the region as a dynamic factor in international relations” (UNASUR Treaty Art 14;
author’s translation).
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instruments of discrimination and exclusion against other states. This outside-inside
dimension is often neglected when the topic of regional organizations is discussed
from a narrow regional integration perspective.
Since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, most world regions
(and subregions) have been characterized by a dense network of partially
overlapping regional organizations. These regional organizations comply with
different functions and interests, and they can be multidimensional. They may
respond both to common interests or fears and to divergent interests or fears.
Regional governance organizations can be demand driven or supply driven. In the
first case, they respond to a common challenge; in the second case, they are created
by governments – as part of a regional project (Tussie 2009) – to promote their
interests within a geographical region by means of these organizations. It is a
“product” that they offer on the political market to realize a profit (with regard to their
political objectives). However, to be successful in this regard they must convince
clients (that is, other states in the region) that this product is useful to them. To put
their regional projects into practice, regional leaders thus need regional followers.
From an analytical perspective, regional organizations feature three dimensions: a
functional dimension that, as a response to regional interconnectedness, responds to
a demand for the regulation of transborder externalities; a power dimension that, as
an instrument of domination by a regional power or as an instrument used by minor
powers, constrains a dominant power by means of regional rules and institutions; and
an ideational and normative-institutional dimension that constructs and gives material
substance to the region. In practice, these dimensions overlap (Nolte 2011).
Most regions feature more than one regional organization. Often, these organizations
are complementary and comply with different functions. Some organizations are
suborganizations of other or broader regional organizations. However, regional
organizations can also overlap (for Africa see De Lombaerde 2011: 37; Genna/De
Lombaerde 2010: 591–592)2 with regard to mandate and membership (see Weiffen
et al. 2012). So one may ask what the reasons and consequences are of the
proliferation and overlapping of regional organizations. Adler and Greve (2009: 73–
To speak of “overlapping regions” (Genna/De Lombaerde 2010: 591–592) should be
qualified based on whether competing regional organizations really construct different
regions.
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75) attribute the “temporal/evolutionary overlap” of regional organizations (in their
case, regional security organizations) primarily to history and the survival of
institutions created in the past.
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There is also an alternative, or at least
complementary, explanation. Regional organizations survive or are newly created
because they serve the conflicting interests of different state actors. Regional powers
(see Nolte 2010; 2011) and their regional projects are important drivers behind the
creation of new regional (intergovernmental) organizations,4 which can compete for
members and mandates (with regard to UNASUR and OAS see Nolte/Wehner 2013).
The “‘balance of practice’ within regions may be as important as balance of (material)
power, or balance of interests” (Adler and Greve 2009: 82).
Generally, the topic of overlapping and competing regional organizations has still not
been sufficiently analysed. What are the consequences for regional cooperation and
integration? How can the evolving regional architecture be conceptualized? Using
these questions as a starting point, we confront the opposing views of the current
state of regional cooperation and integration in Latin America (especially South
America). This paper supports the view that the proliferation of regional organizations
can present national governments with more choice and diminish the risks of
stagnation with regard to processes of regional integration. This argument will be
illustrated with examples from trade and security politics.
“Change in (international) politics, even when discontinuous, is a process through which the
past and the future intersect. Thus, one set of institutions, mechanisms, norms or ideas does
not fully replace another in an instant; rather, they coexist. Old practices and mechanisms
may still have not fully replaced another in an instant, rather they coexist” (Adler and Graf
2009: 73).
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Nolte (2010: 893) defines regional power “as a state which articulates the pretension (selfconception) of a leading position in a region that is geographically, economically and politicalideationally delimited; which displays the material (military, economic, demographic),
organizational (political) and ideological resources for regional power projection; which truly
has great influence in regional affairs (activities and results). In addition, it is expected that a
regional power is a state which is economically, politically and culturally interconnected with
the region; which influences in a significant way the geopolitical delimitation and the politicalideational construction of the region; which exerts this influence by means of regional
governance structures; which defines and articulates a common regional identity or project;
which provides a collective good for the region or participates in a significant way in the
provision of such a collective good; which defines the regional security agenda in a
significant way; whose leading position in the region is recognised or at least respected by
other states inside and outside of the region, especially by other regional powers; which is
integrated in interregional and global forums and institutions where it articulates not only its
own interests but acts as well, at least in a rudimentary way, as a representative of regional
interests.”
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2. The Proliferation of Regional Organizations in Latin America
There have been two waves of regionalism in the post–World War II period
(Mansfield/Milner 1999; Goltermann et al 2012). The second one started in the 1990s,
which, in Latin America, is reflected in the proliferation of regional and subregional
organizations. In 1990, for instance, there were 7 major multi-issue regional and
subregional organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean; this number increased
to 13 in 2012 (Börzel 2013: 509; Goltermann et al 2012: 12–13).5 The newcomers
are the Association of Caribbean States (1994), Mercosur (1991), ALBA (2004),
UNASUR (2008), CELAC (2010) and the Pacific Alliance (2012). Other regional
organizations such as the Andean Pact and the Common Central American Market
have changed their names and/or their objectives.
Although there is consensus that there has been a proliferation of regional and
subregional organizations in Latin America in the last two decades – where “regional
relations have turned into a complex, multilayered arena, where social forces,
regional powers and contending political projects compete” (Tussie 2009: 188) –
there is less consensus with regard to the consequences of this proliferation of
regional organizations and the characterization of the current regional architecture.
The classification of this architecture has varied between third wave (post-neoliberal)
regionalism (Riggirozzi 2012: 18), post-liberal regionalism (Sanahuja 2010; 2012a),
post-hegemonic regionalism (Riggirozzi 2011), heterodox regionalism (Van Klaveren
2012: 137), post-trade integration (Riggirozzi/Tussie 2012: 9f.) to segmented
regionalism, decentralized subregionalisms and hemispheric disintegration (Malamud
and Gardini 2012) or “regionalism light” (Sanahuja 2010).
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There are more regional organizations in Latin America and the Western Hemisphere. A
study lists 31 still-active formal international governmental organizations. This study does not
include ALBA, UNASUR, CELAC or the Pacific Alliance, but differentiates between interAmerican, Latin American and subregional organizations (Jefferson 2007). Another study
counts 25 (Scheman 2007: 32–33) component institutions of the Inter-American System –
differentiating between various areas: overarching cooperation, political cooperation,
development, finance, regulatory and advisory cooperation, trade and economic integration.
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While it seems clear what “old regionalism” denotes and what the “new regionalism”6
or “open regionalism” of the 1990s in Latin America means, it is less clear what kind
of regionalism predominates today. On the one hand, old regionalism is linked to
post-war US-led regional security organizations (like the OAS in Latin America); on
the other, in Latin America it is associated with import substitution industrialization
strategies on a regional scale bolstered by high external tariffs and regulated markets
(Sanahuja 2012). In contrast, the “new regionalism” of the 1980s and 1990s in Latin
America resulted in more independent regional organization with regard to the US
(such as the Rio-Group and a more autonomous role of the OAS) and in the
development of a more autochthonous regional security agenda after the end of the
East-West conflict. New regionalism was linked to the idea of an “open regionalism”
in the economic realm, which aimed to promote market scale and efficiency through
global and regional trade liberalization (IADB 2011: 6) with much lower external tariffs
than in old regionalism. Ultimately, the idea was to win time to realize the objective of
successful integration into the global economy. Although open regionalism sought to
protect the region against some of the risks related to the processes of globalization,
it also promoted – as Sanahuja (2010: 89) has correctly stated – globalization by
supporting intraregional trade liberalization and a neoliberal economic policy. Open
regionalism was perceived as a building block toward global liberalization (Riggirozzi
2012: 32).
Generally speaking, there are three approaches to analyzing or describing the
changing regional architecture in Latin America: The first approach is open ended
and focuses on new and hybrid practices in a “period of transition” (Sanahuja 2010).
From this perspective, it is still not clear how the regional architecture will evolve and
what the emergence of a mixed pattern of overlapping regional organizations and
projects will imply. The second approach is more critical and emphasizes the risk of
regional disintegration and questions whether regional integration has ever been in
Latin America. The third approach stresses the positive potential of a plurality of
overlapping regional organizations.
The first approach is best represented by Diana Tussie and Pia Riggirozzi. Tussie
(2009: 185-186) stated that “the trend may be not towards amalgamation or a single
converged regional bloc, but towards greater diversity of hybrids with mutually fuzzy
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Sbragia (2008: 30) mentions the variations in the use of the concept and the different
theoretical approaches linked to “new regionalism” (see also Söderbaum/Sbragia 2010).
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boundaries, arranging component pieces in ever new combinations underpinned by
increasingly intense regional relations.” Later, Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012: 10)
argued that “regional governance is currently the result of a mosaic where different
regional policies, regional identities and regional forms of cooperation and
competition are transforming the cartography itself.” Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012: 11)
identify three main projects: (1) projects with a strong emphasis on commercial
integration (NAFTA, Pacific Alliance), (2) hybrid projects combining trade (sometimes
with new elements) and political post-trade objectives (UNASUR, Central American
Common Market, Mercosur, CAN), and (3) a project that emphasizes political and
social aspects of integration, reclaiming principles of socialism (ALBA).
It is important to stress the dynamic character of regionalism and the corresponding
regional architecture in Latin America. As Riggirozzi (2011: 20) remarks, older
regional organizations and projects do not necessarily disappear. There is no
process of substitution, but one of overlapping of older and newer organizations.
Different regional organizations may compete and change over time with regard to
their function and importance. This explains a growing interest in the analysis of
hybrid forms of regional integration (Tussie 2009; Riggirozzi/Tussie 2012) and of the
overlapping of regional organizations with regard to mandates, membership and
practices (Adler/Greve 2009; Weiffen/Wehner/Nolte 2012).
Contrary to Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012) generally positive view of current trends,
Malamud and Gardini (2012) have a more critical view of the proliferation of regional
organizations. They state that “the presence of segmented and overlapping
regionalist projects is not a manifestation of successful integration but, on the
contrary, it signals the exhaustion of its potential” (Malamud and Gardini 2012: 117).
In their view, the proliferation of regional organizations in Latin America will result in
decentralized subregionalisms and hemispheric disintegration. Moreover, the multiple
membership in different (sub)regional organizations will create friction between and
within regional integration projects and will fuel divisions instead of unity in the region.
While Malamud and Gardini (2012) focus on the risks, there might also be positive
aspects related to the proliferation and overlapping of regional organizations. From a
more general perspective based on European experiences, Hofmann and Mérand
(2012) argue in favor of differentiated multilateral cooperation and “institutional
elasticity,” which can foster peaceful and stable interstate relations within a region
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and minimize the risk of zero-sum politics. In their view, “outright bargaining failures
become less likely as member states have the flexibility to opt out of certain
institutionalized policy domains or they can push for their preferred policy preferences
in another institution.” It reduces the possibility regional integration stagnating
because actors can switch between arenas and there are more points from where
new initiatives can be launched. The authors refer to a European-type “variable
geometry,” where no state “feels forced to belong to the entire club, and hence is
more willing to invest in the policy areas that are close to its interest”
(Hofmann/Mérand 2012: 137). Sanahuja (2010: 110) emphasizes that the
constitutive treaty of UNASUR (see Art. 13) explicitly opens the possibility of a
variable geometry–styled architecture in South America.7
Hofmann and Mérand (2012) also criticize the tendency to look at regional
organizations in isolation, “thus neglecting the specific properties of an institutional
architecture (i.e., how different regional organizations are assembled together) and
the impact that these properties have on regional order.” In the end, the whole (i.e.,
the combination and interaction of different regional organizations in Latin America)
may be greater than the sum of its parts (i.e., analyzing regional organizations
separately). The focus on one isolated regional organization – for example,
MERCOSUR – might lead to inaccurate conclusions about the state of regional
integration. Therefore, it makes better sense to discuss the whole regional
architecture rather than to focus on separate regional organizations.
3. Menu à la Carte and Differentiated Multilateral Cooperation in Latin
America
Today, Latin America offers a broad spectrum of regional organizations that embrace
different issue areas, reflect different types of integration and cooperation, and
Article 13 stipulates that “one or more Member States may submit to the consideration of the
Council of Delegates a proposal for the adoption of policies, creation of common institutions,
organisations and programmes to be adopted in an agreed manner, on the basis of flexible,
gradual criteria of implementation in line with the objectives of UNASUR […]. Programmes,
institutions and organisations in which Member States participate prior to the entry into force
of this Treaty may be considered as UNASUR programmes, institutions or organisations […].
Any Member State may fully or partially exempt itself from implementing an approved policy,
for a set time or indefinitely, without this preventing said State from subsequently
incorporating the policy, either fully or partially.”
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represent different political ideological projects. In this context, each Latin American
country can choose the mix of regional organizations or cooperation structures that
best fits its interests.
It would appear that likeminded Latin American states join each other to foster their
common interests. Taking the issue of free trade and open markets as an example, it
is possible to differentiate between the interests of the countries of the Pacific
Alliance, the Mercosur members and the ALBA members. The countries that form
part of these groupings have different average tariffs, different numbers of free trade
agreement partners, and a different volume or percentage of trade concentrated in
these partner countries.
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Source: IADB 2012b
Source: IADB 2012b
When we look at security, the regional cooperation patterns are different. There is the
OAS, an overarching Western Hemispheric organization (which includes the US and
Canada) that is in competition with UNASUR and the South American Defense
Council (see Nolte/Wehner 2013) with regard to conflict resolution and security
cooperation. While three Pacific Alliance countries (Chile, Colombia and Peru) are
part of UNASUR and the South American Defense Council, Mexico is not. Instead,
Mexico maintains close security cooperation with the US and the Central America
countries, which have also created their own security cooperation forums – such as
the Central America Regional Security Initiative. The cooperation in the different
security related organizations reflect both common and divergent security threats and
interests. Despite sharing basic UNASUR goals, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela
also pursue separate goals within ALBA.
As the above examples demonstrate, there are different cooperation patterns (and
regional organizations) in different issue areas. Trade is not the only foundation for
regional cooperation and integration. And as Riggirozzi (2011: 34) stresses, there
has been “a strong critique to unmediated marketization reclaiming the region as a
space for the provision of regional goods beyond trade and market competitiveness.”
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Moreover, when we look at the basis for trade-based integration, the picture is quite
mixed. Trade statistics demonstrate that intraregional trade in Latin America and in
the different regional and subregional integration systems is low (see also Burges
2005) and much lower than in other world regions such as Europe, Asia and NAFTA
(but not in Africa, see Draper 2012). In 2012, intraregional trade in Latin America
amounted to only 11 percent in the case of Mercosur, 7 percent in the case of the
Andean Community (CAN), 26 percent in the case of the Common Central American
Market (CACM) and 18 percent for all of Latin America. Intraregional trade is much
higher in NAFTA (48 percent) and in the Americas (54 percent). This is basically the
result of the strength of US exports to and imports from the Western Hemisphere.
Table x: Intraregional Trade in Latin America and the Americas (2012)
Intratrade
destination LA
dest. NAFTA
dest. Americas
11
22
18
39
7
28
33
61
CACM
26
39
38
74
Latin America
18
18
42
59
NAFTA
48
18
48
57
Americas
54
19
42
54
Mercosur
CAN
Source: IADB 2012a
From a strictly economic perspective, an FTAA would make more sense than the
different subregional integration projects in Latin America. However, these are not
merely economic projects; they reflect the regional projects of regional major and
minor powers. Regional projects such as Mercosur, UNASUR and ALBA mark the
regional landscape more than economic interdependencies; regionalism and
regionalist projects are not only related to trade and “market governance” (Riggirozzi
2011: 34). One might also argue that with the percentage of intraregional trade quite
low, there is perhaps less need for a deepening of regional economic integration in
Latin America, and more need for “an explicit political agenda oriented to an
assertion of political identity within the wider region and within the global political
economy” (Phillips/Prieto 2011: 120).
Up to now, much of the debate on regional integrations has been too focused on
structures (supranational organizations), and less on the functions that these
structures have to comply with. Weak intraregional economic interdependencies do
not need strong supranational economic institutions. Different patterns of cooperation
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in different issue areas can coexist; in some cases, regional organizations may
compete and overlap in the same issue area. Regional projects and the regional
powers that promote these projects are drivers of regional cooperation and
integration. From this perspective, regions – which are socially and politically
constructed – are an area for contestation (Riggirozzi/Tussie 2012b: 6).
4. Regionalism Is What Actors Make of It
Sanahuja (2012a: 25) writes that through UNASUR “the aspirations of Latin American
regional integration are redefined in a South American geographical and ideational
framework.” Regions and regional projects are historically contingent and changing
social constructs. There is not one prefabricated model of what constitutes a region.
Alluding to Alexander Wendt’s famous title, Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012: 3) write that
“region is what actors make of it.” This article shares the vision that one should take
seriously the statements, declarations and proposals of actors involved in regional
projects and should not ask for the delivery of goods not promised by the actors
involved (in our case, Latin American governments). However, this is a major bias
found in many recent analyses of current Latin American regionalism. These
analyses start with a preconceived notion of what regionalism should be and normally
end up with a narrow model of European-style integration that includes strong
supranational institutions and the transfer of sovereignty. For example, Malamud and
Gardini (2012: 130) state that “Latin American states continue to establish regional
organizations because their leaders know that sovereignty is not relinquished by
signing papers. Rather, regionalism is a foreign policy resource used to achieve other
ends such as international visibility, regional stability and regime legitimacy.” One
might ask what is problematic with regard to these self-declared goals. The only fault
is that they do not correspond to the EU model.
Although the European experience of regional integration is unique, many authors
often take Europe as the “gold standard” of regional integration (Sbragia 2008: 33).
Subsequently, they come to the unsurprising conclusion that regional experiences
outside of Europe do not constitute real integration. 8 A good example of this
What Söderbaum and Sbragia (2010: 565) write about earlier studies of regionalism and
regional integration, especially from a neofunctionalist perspective, is still valid for more
recent studies: “All too often (but not always) the European Community was seen and
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approach is an article by Andrés Malamud and Philippe Schmitter (2011: 143), who
start with the statement that they understand integration in European terms – quoting
Haas (1971) – as a process in which nation states voluntarily mingle, merge and mix
with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty and (adding to
Haas’s definition) “that they do so by creating common and permanent institutions
capable of making decisions binding on all members.” From this perspective, CAN
and MERCOSUR have made little progress toward integration. Both authors are
strictly against a softening or changing of the definition because they fear an
overextension (conceptual stretching) of the concept of regional integration. In their
view, “regional integration should be conceptually differentiated from simple, that is,
un-institutionalized and usually erratic, regional cooperation or collaboration.” There
seems to be a very strong bias against all kinds of regional integration and
cooperation that do not resemble the European pattern. Consequently, Malamud and
Schmitter (2011: 143) disagree that there might be “a distinctive “Latin American” (or,
for that matter, “Asian”9 or “African”) pattern of integration that may not resemble the
European “institutional” one, but nevertheless is capable of resolving regional
problems, asserting regional cohesion and building regional identity.”
But some Latin American authors articulate a totally different vision of integration. In
the view of the Argentinean economist Aldo Ferrer (2013), the key for successful
integration does not rest upon the delegation of sovereignty to supranational
communitarian institutions. For him, the experience of the European Union
demonstrates that the concession of sovereignty results in the subordination of the
weaker states to the hegemonic power of the stronger states. Therefore, he argues in
favor of an integration that is not based on the transfer of sovereignty but rather in
the solidary construction of sovereignty, which is still missing for many Latin
American states in certain issue areas. Thus for Ferrer, “integration consists in the
advocated as the model and other looser and informal modes of regionalism were, wherever
they appeared, characterised as ‘weaker’ or ‘failed’ (i.e. with no ‘regional integration’
according to the predominant definition).”
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Kahler (2013: 15) defines the “Asian Way” as follows: “Governments have been reluctant to
delegate substantial authority to regional institutions; limited delegation is combined with low
levels of legalization, measured by precise and binding obligations. Asian regional institutions
are also exclusively intergovernmental: Non-state actors are not directly enfranchised in
regional courts or other institutions. The decision rules of these institutions are based on
consensus building, which emphasizes persuasion and deliberation, rather than decisiveness.
Membership tends to be set by geographical criteria rather than policy stipulations; policy
convergence is expected after accession through a process of socialization.”
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complementation and extension of national sovereignties.” 10 For Van Langenhove
(2012: 20) “regions can take over or complement state actorness”.
Public opinion surveys in the region corroborate the preference for a Latin American
type of integration focused on economic cooperation and liberalization and the
improvement of regional infrastructure, and less interested in the creation of
supranational institutions and in relinquishing sovereignty. In general, Brazilians,
Chileans, Colombians, Ecuadorians, Peruvians and Mexicans did not place great
importance on the promotion of regional integration as a foreign policy objective
(Maldonado 2012).
Rising powers such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa do not promote an EUtype model of regional integration (Fawcett 2013). Against these countries will and
without their participation, it will not be possible to create this kind of institution in the
corresponding regions. One should also mention that the euro crisis has seen the EU
become a less attractive role model. Furthermore, the EU has also demonstrated that
there is a risk of estrangement between the citizens of member states and the
supranational institutions. One should not forget that integration is not an end in itself;
its success and institutional arrangement depend on the interests of the participating
states and those states’ citizens. The EU is not always seen as the benchmark for
integration processes.
5. Regional Integration or Regional Governance
Critics of Latin American regionalism often start with a narrow definition of regional
integration or ask Latin American governments for something that they did not
promise or did not aim for. However, if one accepts that actors decide what
“La clave del éxito de la integración no radica en la delegación de soberanía a órganos
supranacionales comunitarios. La experiencia de la Unión Europea alcanza para demostrar
cómo la cesión de soberanía termina subordinando a las partes más débiles al poder
hegemónico de los más fuertes. Mucho peor, cuando en el régimen comunitario, como
sucede en la Unión Europea, prevalece el paradigma neoliberal. Nuestra integración no
radica en la cesión de soberanía, sino en la construcción solidaria de la soberanía que nos
falta en la ciencia y la tecnología, el desarrollo industrial y la inclusión social. En materia
financiera, en tiempos recientes, se han dado pasos positivos en tal sentido, a través del
desendeudamiento externo, la acumulación de reservas internacionales y los controles de
los capitales especulativos. La integración consiste entonces en la complementación de las
soberanías nacionales a través de reglas realistas de la integración” (Ferrer 2013).
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regionalism is, one should look for concepts that can capture different and changing
regional projects and forms of regional cooperation.
Regionalism is generally accepted as an overarching concept referring, respectively,
to “the formation of and policies pursued by inter-state groups based around regions”
(Nye 1968: vii), “the policies and practices of state-based permanent organizations
with membership confined to a limited geographical area” (Fawcett 2013: 4), “the
policy and project, whereby state and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate
strategy within a particular region” (Söderbaum 2009) or “a state- or state-led project
to organize a region along particular political and economic lines” (Phillips/Prieto
2011: 117).
Even though there is no substantial variation with regard to the meaning of the
concept of regionalism, some definitions are technically more neutral, while others
have a transformative or teleological component. There are also some definitions that
are more economistic and demanding, which risk leading to negative conclusions.11
While there is a basic consensus on the concept of regionalism, there is much less
consensus on how to conceptualize different forms of regionalism. Most authors will
agree that regional integration is a narrower subcategory of regionalism that is
principally based on the European post–World War II experience. Börzel (2013: 508)
differentiates between regional cooperation and regional integration. She contends
that regional integration “involves the setting up of supranational institutions to which
political authority is delegated to make collective binding decision,” whereas regional
cooperation refers to “the joint exercise of state-based political authority in
intergovernmental institutions to solve collective action problems related to economic,
political or security issues.”
Although Börzel (2013) argues strongly in favor of clearly differentiate between
regional cooperation and regional integration, one might also conceptualize regional
integration as a special type or subset – “not the most successful or even the most
frequent” (Malamud 2013: 2) – of regional cooperation. From a neofunctionalist
perspective, regional integration might be the unintended consequence of regional
cooperation. Quite often, regional integration projects have resulted in some shallow
‘‘Regionalism in Latin America can best be understood as serving a set of political
objectives, but that it can no longer be seen as playing a significant role in driving processes
of structural political-economic change in the region’’ (Phillips/Prieto 2011: 120).
11
17
form of regional integration that some other authors would classify as mere regional
cooperation.
Börzel (2013) perceives regional (intergovernmental) integration and regional
(supranational) cooperation as two opposite ends of a continuum of regionalism.
However, one might ask whether too much emphasis is being placed on one end of
the continuum (i.e., regional integration) given that there is only one flawless example
for this category: the EU. On the other hand, the terrain between these opposite ends
remains largely unexplored. Moreover, it seems to be that the landscape between
regional cooperation and regional integration is more populated than the regional
integration corral.
Malamud (2010: 650) argues that without the Latin American test case, there would
be no basis for the comparison of the integration process in the EU (“the n = 1
problem”). Therefore, he claims that “comparative regional integration, not
comparative governance, is the only way to deal with the root phenomenon.”
However, there are good arguments against using a narrow concept of regional
integration as a benchmark for regionalism:

It is important to take seriously the statements, declarations and proposals made
by the actors (in this case, Latin American governments) involved in regional
projects, rather than to ask these actors to deliver projects in which they were not
involved and did not promise. (Regionalism is what actors make of it.)

Regional integration constitutes, at best, only a small subcategory of regionalism.
(Do not generalize too much from a limited number of cases.)

Taking a strict definition of regional integration, which is based on the unique case
of the EU, will result in other regional arrangements being considered
unsatisfactory approximations of successful (EU-type) regional integration at best.
(Do not generalize from a single case study; EU scholars should accept that
they are “only” area and case specialists.)

The cases situated between pure regional integration and pure regional
cooperation are more frequent and perhaps more interesting from a comparative
and real world political perspective. (There are more cases of “regional
integration/cooperation” outside of Europe.)
•
There is a bias toward focusing on a single regional organization focusing when
analyzing regional integration. Regions are, however, generally constituted by
18
more than one organization – which is also true for Europe. Of greater interest
should be the interaction pattern between different regional organizations. (The
whole is greater than the sum of its parts.)
•
In general, there are different regional organizations that overlap and compete
with regard to membership and mandate; this often reflects competing models of
regional integration/cooperation. (Regions are areas of contestation for
regional projects and competing or complementary regional organizations.)
•
Regional organizations separate the region as a subsystem from the international
system and can be used as instruments of discrimination toward and exclusion of
other states. This outside-inside dimension is often neglected when the topic of
regional organizations is discussed from a narrow regional integration perspective.
(Take regional organizations as gatekeepers.)
•
Actors can use regional organizations to create rules and norms with a view to
protecting their autonomy from the dominance or abuse by more powerful actors
from outside of the region (Take into account the “norm subsidiarity” of
regional organizations.)
•
Regionalism is not only market integration. There are also other issue areas of
equal or greater importance – for example, regional security (Trade is not all you
need, give peace a chance.)
•
A region is a space for the promotion of regional independencies and the
provision of regional public goods beyond trade and market competitiveness
(Take a look at regional public goods.)
•
Up to now, much of the debate on regional integration has been too focused on
structures (supranational organizations) and not focused enough on the functions
that these structures have to comply with. For example, weak intraregional
economic interdependencies do not need strong supranational economic
institutions. (Form follows function.)
•
One should differentiate between the process of integration and the governance
of integration (Sbragia: 2008: 35). (There might be different forms of
governance in processes of integration.)
•
Regional projects and the regional powers that promote these projects are
important drivers and spoilers of regional cooperation and integration. The same
is true of external powers with influence or influential regional partners that can
19
exert pressure on the processes of regional integration. (Context and power
matter.)
As can be seen, the concept of regional integration manifests some problems. One
solution might be to adapt and make more flexible the concept of regional integration.
It might be “used as synonymous for regionalism and/or regionalization” (De
Lombaerde 2011: 38) or defined as “a historical process of increased levels of
interaction between political units (subnational, national, or transnational), provided
by actors sharing common ideas, setting objectives and defining methods to achieve
them, and by doing so contributing to building a region” (Dabène 2009: 215). From
another perspective, regional integration can be perceived “as a platform for
functional cooperation.” It “allows countries to pursue more effective collective
policies beyond trade integration, in particular: (i) a greater voice in global fora […]; (ii)
a platform for the provision of regional public goods (RPGs) […] and (iii) a natural
space to address asymmetries and promote cohesion.” (IADB 2011: 6)
In contrast to economic liberalization and trade agendas that have dominated in the
past, other authors introduce the concept of “positive regionalization” or “positive
integration” as a new subcategory of regional integration based on political
consensus building, the promotion of regional independencies, and an increase in
cooperation in nontrade issues (e.g., energy, infrastructure, finance and regional
security) (Ayuso 2012; Sanahuja 2010; Sanahuja 2012a). The concept of positive
integration is compatible with different regional projects covering different issue areas
and the overlay of regional organizations. It might also be applicable to integration
projects in Africa (see Draper 2012).12
Van Langenhove (2012: 18/20) conceptualizes regional integration as “the formation
of supranational spaces of cooperation between states.” In his view, “regions can
take over or complement state actorness.” Although, Goltermann et al. (2012: 4)
define integration – rather similarly to Börzel (2013) – as “a transfer and pooling of
sovereignty rights to a third body, usually a regional organization,” one might ask
whether the pooling and the transfer of sovereignty necessarily go hand in hand.
12
With regard to the perspectives of regional economic integration in sub-Saharan Africa,
Draper (2012: 79) mentions the pooling of capacities to provide regional public goods and
construct network services (energy, finance, telecommunications, transport).
20
With the objective to advancing toward a “post-Westphalian” concept of state and
pooled sovereignty, Sanahuja (2012) argues in favor of a “denationalization” of the
concept of sovereignty and space as well as of the “locus” of politics and power. The
question is whether this is possible without the creation of strong supranational
institutions – like those found in the EU.
Is there another model of pooled
sovereignty and of a “post-Westphalian” order? Perhaps a pooling of sovereignty is
possible without transferring sovereignty; there may be different types and paths of
integration.
Van Langenhove (2012: 21/28) differentiates between three major types of actions
that lead to regional integration: “removing economic obstacles towards integration;
building adequate institutions or regulations that favor the delivery of regional public
goods; and presenting the integrated region as a unit with some level of sovereignty.”
This can lead to three different major varieties of regional integration: “a single
market; a provider of services and policies; and an international actor with a certain
degree of actorness in global affairs.”
One might also ask whether there is a need for concepts other than “regional
integration” to analyze the evolving Latin American regionalism. Based on the
previous arguments, such a concept should capture the pooling of sovereignty
without the necessity of building supranational institutions, the formation of
supranational spaces of cooperation, the actorness of a region in regard to actors
outside of the region, the provision of regional public goods, and the integration of
different regional organizations and competing regional projects.
What are the alternative concepts to regional integration and regional cooperation
that can be used to describe the field of regionalism and to analyze the evolving Latin
American regionalism? One option would be “regional architecture;” often used, but
seldom defined. More recently, regional architecture has been defined as “a
reasonably coherent network of regional organizations, institutions, bilateral and
multilateral arrangements, dialogue forums and other relevant mechanisms that work
collectively for regional prosperity, peace and stability” (Weixing Hu 2009: 14). One
can also adapt the concept of “global governance architecture,” which has been
defined as “the overarching system of public and private institutions that are valid or
active in a given issue area of world politics” (Biermann et al 2009: 15) to the regional
level. While the first definition makes no reference to rule setting and rule enforcing in
21
a territorial (regional) space, the second definition describes “architecture” “as the
meta-level of governance” and is focused on a particular issue area (Biermann et al
2009: 15f.).
Regions are political constructs. Regional organizations perform regulatory functions
within the corresponding region. Therefore, the regulations and political institutions
that construct the territorial space of a region should be at the core of a concept that
distinguishes between different forms of regionalism. This article argues that the
concept of regional governance is the most adequate concept to capture the
variations of regionalism and of regional projects. This idea is not new; “regional
governance” is often used in textbooks, but often not clearly defined and
conceptualized.
How is regional governance best defined? Schimmelfennig (2006: 154) defines
regional governance as a “regional space of political order and regulation” (“einen
regionalen Raum politischer Ordnung und Steuerung”). Söderbaum (2004: 422)
draws on Rosenau (1997) and defines regional governance “as spheres of authority
at the regional level of human activity which amount to systems of rule – formal and
informal, public or private – in which goals are pursued through the exercise of
control.” Although Fawcett and Serrano (2005) do not provide a clear-cut definition,
they appear to adhere to a dynamic concept of regional governance 13 that refers to a
process of setting rules and creating rules, which are enforced by institutions within a
geographical space (Fawcett and Serrrano 2005: 19).14
Riggirozzi (2011) uses the concept of regional governance in the sense of models of
governance that manifest a different logic of structuring a region with regard to the
institutionalization of norms and practices in support of a regional community.
Jayasuriya (2004: 21–22) also makes reference to “regional governance projects.”
His encompassing definition fixes the following parameters. Regional governance
projects should be composed of four core elements: (1) a stable set of international
“The real game of governance lies in defining the rules before playing them” (Serrano 2005:
19).
14
Adler and Greve (2009: 64–65) define governance as an “order-creating mechanism” and
security governance “as a system of rule conceived by individual and corporate actors aiming
at coordinating, managing and regulating their collective existence in response to threats to
their physical and ontological security. […] Mechanisms of security governance are a more or
less clearly delineated set of rules, norms practices and institutions that coordinate security
relations between actors in the international system.”
13
22
economic strategies, (2) a distinctive set of governance structures that enable
regional economic governance, (3) a set of normative or ideational constructs that not
only make possible a given set of regional governance structures but also make
possible the very definition of the region, and (4) a convergence of domestic
coalitions and political economy structures that facilitate the coherent construction of
regional projects.
In another article, and without the strong economic component of the former
definition, Jayasuriya (2009a: 321)15 defines regional governance more broadly as
“the management of the conflicts created through growing interdependencies within a
specific – albeit ideologically-constructed – geographical region through the creation
of institutional forums, policy instruments and networks of private and public
actors.”16 He further adds that “regional governance encompasses those institutions,
instruments and mechanisms that allocate power, influence material stakes and
shape the ideological representation of the region itself.”
Summarizing
these
definitions,
regional
governance
refers
to
international
institutions/organizations and normative/ideational constructs as well as to the
process that creates these institutions and norms.
17
Regional governance is
essentially, but not exclusively, based on regional organizations. It is not restricted to
a single organization but refers to the set of relevant regional organizations and their
interaction patterns. One may define regional governance as the overall configuration
of regional organizations that frame the regional discourse of the member states and
generate the norms and rules for the region that contribute to the solution of
collective problems and to the realization of common benefits.
But can the concept of governance confront the problem of different and overlapping
organizations within a region and of different interaction patterns between regional
organizations? For the analysis of regional governance, this article adapts an
interesting research approach developed for the analysis of global climate
15
In another article, Jayasuriya (2009b) focuses on new modes of regional governance
(regulatory governance) based on region-wide regulatory frameworks that as a new form of
multilevel governance transform the internal spatial architecture of the state.
16
Komori (2009) in his concept of a “multilayered” form of regional governance also includes
nonstate actors, even though national governments remain the dominant actors.
17
This conceptualization of governance is congruent with the definition of Keohane and Nye
(2000: 12): “By governance, we mean the processes and institutions, both formal and
informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group.”
23
governance (Biermann et al 2009). Based on the fragmentation of global climate
governance, the authors created an analytical scheme that could capture the
possible effects of fragmentation. This article is interested in the potential positive or
negative interaction patterns of competing and overlapping regional organizations,
which can be complementary or competitive. Biermann et al. (2009) employ three
criteria or analytical dimensions to differentiate between degrees of fragmentation,
which can be adapted for the analysis of regional governance patterns: (1)
institutional integration and the degree of overlap between decision-making systems
(= regional organizations), (2) the existence and degree of norm conflicts (between
regional organizations), and (3) the type of actor constellations – which in the case of
regional governance refers particularly to the interests and politics of regional powers
and secondary powers. Just as Biermann et al (2009) differentiate between three
different kinds of fragmentation (synergistic, cooperative and conflictive), this article
uses the same categories to differentiate between different patterns of interaction
between regional organizations and state actors within a region in order to classify
different types of regional governance (see table xxx) – synergistic, cooperative and
conflictive regional governance. In the future, it should be possible to refine this
scheme to differentiate between different degrees within the analytical categories –
for example, between “deep” and “shallow” regional governance (adapted from De
Lombaerde 2011: 36).18 And it will be necessary to develop indicators for the different
analytical categories (work in progress!!).
Table xxx: Patterns of Regional Governance
Institutional Integration
Norm Conflicts
Synergistic
Cooperative
Conflictive
One core institution,
Core institutions with
Different, largely
with other institutions
other institutions that
unrelated institutions
being closely integrated
are loosely integrated
Core norms of
Core norms are not
Core norms
institutions are
conflicting
conflict
All relevant actors
Some actors remain
Major actors support
support the same
outside main
different institutions
integrated
Actor Constellations
Another option could be to differentiate between “patterns of regional governance” and
“forms of regional governance” as a product of region building (Van Langenhove 2012: 17)
and combine both analytical concepts. See also Genna and Lombaerde (2010: 584) who
introduce the concept of the “institutionalization of the regionalization process,” which “can be
very weak (or even nonexistent) or supranational in nature, which speaks to the degree of
integration.”
18
24
institutions
institutions, but
maintain cooperation
Source: Adapted from Biermann et al. (2009: 19)
Table 1: Regional Governance Complexes
Institutional Integration
Norm Conflicts
Actor Constellations
Synergistic
One core institution,
with other institutions
being closely integrated
Core norms of
institutions are
integrated
All relevant actors
support the same
institutions
Cooperative
Core institutions with
other institutions that
are loosely integrated
Core norms are not
conflicting
Segmented
Different, largely
unrelated institutions
Some actors remain
outside main
institutions, but
maintain cooperation
Major actors support
different institutions
Core norms in
conflict or unrelated
Based on this approach, the EU represents synergetic regional governance, South
America features strong cooperative regional governance, Latin America reflects
weak cooperative regional governance, and the Western Hemisphere constitutes a
form of conflictive regional governance.
6. The New Architecture of Regional Governance in Latin America and the
Implications for the Interregional Relations between Latin America and
Europe
The first biregional summit between the EU and CELAC (the recently created allinclusive regional organization of Latin America and the Caribbean) in Santiago de
Chile in January 2013 did not produce any important new initiatives. However, it did
incorporate new actors and widen interregional dialogue through the inclusion of a
judicial summit with representatives from Latin American and European Supreme
courts and an academic summit with delegates from Latin American and European
universities and research institutes (Gratius/Nolte 2013).
The countries of the newly created Pacific Alliance (Mexico, Colombia, Peru and
Chile) took advantage of the EU-CELAC Summit to promote their common project
and their interest in free trade and foreign direct investment (within a framework of
stable property rights). While the ALBA countries generally articulated a critical view
25
of a free trade–based cooperation with the EU, the MERCOSUR countries –
especially Argentina and Brazil, the drivers of MERCOSUR – were not able to
present a common position. Moreover, on their way to Santiago, EU representatives
stopped in Brasilia for a separate EU-Brazil Summit as part of the strategic
partnership between the EU and Brazil – once more setting Brazil apart as a
privileged partner.
At first sight, it seems paradoxical that the first biregional summit between the EU
and CELAC took place in a context of regional fragmentation and (subregional)
competition. In view of the divergent interests articulated by Latin American countries
and regional organizations, one might ask how a variable geometry of regional
governance in Latin America and to a smaller degree in Europe is compatible with a
strategic partnership between these two regions.
On the one hand, the course of the EU-CELAC Summit demonstrated the conflicts of
interest in both regions and also reflected differences with regard to the regional
governance structure in Europe and Latin America. On the other hand, it also
revealed some advantages of cooperative regional governance and a variablegeometry type of governance architecture on the Latin American side.
The differentiated multilateral cooperation patterns in Latin America open up more
access points for external actors such as the EU. There is less risk of a total
stagnation of inter-regional cooperation. The EU has reacted to the divergent
cooperation patterns and interests in Latin America with the differentiation and
multilateralization of its relations. The EU quite recently signed free trade and
cooperation agreements with Central America as well as with Colombia and Peru,
while free trade agreements with Chile and Mexico entered into force some years
ago. In addition, the EU has signed an economic partnership agreement with the
member countries of the CARIFORUM and also maintains strategic partnerships and
holds separate meetings with Brazil and Mexico.
The variable geometry of cooperative regional governance offers EU and Latin
American countries the opportunity to create and maintain differentiated networks of
cooperation that respond to the converging or diverging interests of the involved
partners. Such an arrangement will help reduce vetoes by individual countries
blocking the whole process of interregional cooperation. When the negotiations for an
26
association agreement between the EU and the Andean Community were blocked by
Bolivia and Ecuador, the EU signed an agreement with only Colombia and Peru. In
the future, the topics and format (bilateral, intersubregional or interregional) will be
adjusted to the interests and the influence of the partners on both sides.
The examples of Europe and Latin America demonstrate that although regions can
be constructed quite differently and evolve with regard to their institutional
architecture, they can nevertheless establish an interregional cooperation pattern.
This pattern reflects the differentiated constellation of interests on both sides
(especially with regard to the major regional players) and the dissimilar regional
governance structures in Europe and Latin America. The result is a multilevel policy
of concentric circles, which currently include the following elements (Gratius/Nolte
2013):

EU’s close bilateral relations with its strategic partners Brazil and Mexico and the
countries of the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru)

dialogue and development cooperation with weaker partners and biregional
relations with Central America and the Caribbean

summit meetings between both regions in a bioregional format that define
corridors and overarching aims of cooperation
The variable geometry of internal and external cooperation diminishes the risk of
stagnation in interregional relations between Europe and Latin America. However, it
also makes Latin America more porous with regard to external influences. Therefore,
a principal challenge for cooperative regional governance in Latin America will be to
create institutional mechanisms that guarantee a minimum degree of coherence in
interregional relations.
27
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