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REV: MARCH 8, 2017
CHRISTOPHER A. BARTLETT
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Unilever’s Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the
Sustainability Plan
In early 2013, Samir Singh faced a challenge—in fact, a double challenge. When he was named
Global Brand VP for Lifebuoy soap in early 2010, this iconic Unilever brand was suffering. Its global
market share had fallen from 11.2% in 2005 to 9.7% in 2009. In India, its largest market, the situation
was even worse: its 2009 share had dropped to 15.5% from 18.4% four years earlier. But just as Singh
and his team managed to reverse the decline, his boss challenged them to double sales in five years.
tC
As large as this task was, it was made even more demanding by another commitment Singh had
made—to improve the health and hygiene of a billion people by 2015. This ambitious goal was part of
the Unilever Sustainable Living Program (USLP), an initiative introduced by the company’s newly
appointed CEO, Paul Polman. Aiming to decouple Unilever’s growth from its impact on earth, USLP
challenged the company to halve the environmental footprint of its products, to source 100% of its
agricultural raw materials sustainably, and to help improve the health and well-being of a billion
people worldwide. Singh’s challenge was to make Lifebuoy the standard-bearer of this last goal while
simultaneously doubling sales and meeting ambitious profit objectives. It would be quite a test.
Unilever’s History, Lifebuoy’s Heritage
No
Despite an uneven performance in recent decades, by 2012 Unilever had reemerged as a very
effective global competitor challenging companies like Procter & Gamble and Nestlé for a share of the
fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) industry. (For financial results, see Exhibit 1.) But its business
and management philosophies still had deep roots in the company’s origins.
Lifebuoy’s Origins: Born of a Company with a Conscience
Born in the north of England in 1851 at the height of the Industrial Revolution, William Hesketh
Lever grew up in an era when Britain’s squalid urban environments were a breeding ground for
typhoid, cholera, and smallpox. In his early 20s, he left a thriving family grocery store to start his own
business making soap, a product he felt could help ameliorate the wretched conditions.
Do
In 1888, Lever built Port Sunlight as a model village for employees working at his nearby Sunlight
soap factory. By today’s values, Port Sunlight would be viewed as paternalistic, but at the time, it was
celebrated as a benevolent offering of a generous employer. Lever expressed strong ideals for his
Emeritus Professor Christopher A. Bartlett prepared this case. It was reviewed and approved before publication by a company designate.
Funding for the development of this case was provided by Harvard Business School and not by the company. Certain details have been
disguised. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary
data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.
Copyright © 2014, 2016, 2017 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www.hbsp.harvard.edu. This publication may not be digitized,
photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School.
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fledgling Lever Brothers Ltd.: “I believe that nothing can be greater than a business, however small it
may be, that is governed by conscience,” he said. “And that nothing can be meaner or more petty
than a business, however large, governed without honesty and without brotherhood.”
The philosophy gave rise to Lever’s conviction that business success went hand-in-hand with
ethical practices and a sense of social responsibility. He believed that if he took care of his workers,
they would be more productive, and if he sold innovative products that benefited the public, the
business would prosper. It was a philosophy he described as “doing well by doing good.”
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These values were evident at the birth of the company’s iconic Lifebuoy soap in 1894. Lever held
that Joseph Lister’s discovery of antiseptic properties in carbolic acid offered a solution to the disease
rampant in Britain’s grimy urban centers. At a time when soap was still regarded as a luxury, he
introduced Lifebuoy at a price the working class could afford. Within a year, he was exporting his
“soap that could save lives” to the United States and much of the British Empire.
Managing Global Expansion: New Strategic and Organizational Challenges
In 1930, seeking sourcing economies for their common raw material of palm oil, Lever Brothers
and Dutch margarine producer Margarine Unie merged to create a new company called Unilever. As
the company expanded abroad, it managed its offshore operations through a classic geographic
organization in which strong, independent, national operating companies (referred to internally as
Opcos) held prime responsibility. Opco country managers typically had the final decision on key
issues, while business and product groups played support and advisory roles.
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But as competitive forces demanded new technologies, distribution systems, and marketing skills,
the need for more cross-market, product-based coordination became clear. Over the following four
decades, Unilever struggled to retain the Opcos’ historic local responsiveness while also capturing
these regional- and global-scale efficiencies. In the process, it developed a complex multilayered
organization structure that made flexible decision-making difficult. By the end of the 20th century,
the company had come to be regarded as a formidable but slow-moving giant in the FMCG industry.
100-Year-Old Lifebuoy Enters 21st-Century India
No
In 1995, as Lifebuoy celebrated its 100th-year anniversary on the Indian market, the familiar red,
carbolic soap brick was the country’s leading health soap. But its age was beginning to show.
Marketplace Upheavals: Threat or Opportunity?
Do
In 2000, after a decade of rapid growth, the Indian economy stalled and its FMCG market ground
to a halt. In 2001, total demand in the personal soap market declined 9.3%.1 Aggressive new local
competitors began offering attractive beauty soaps, particularly in the lower-priced segment where
Lifebuoy had long been dominant. The result was that Lifebuoy became seen as a cheap oldfashioned soap, and its market share fell from 15.4% in 1997 to 12.1% in 2001.2 Alarmingly, its sales
value declined by more than 20% in a single year between 2000 and 2001.3
Since most of this decline occurred in rural areas—markets accounting for nearly 70% of Lifebuoy
sales—executives at Hindustan Unilever (HUL) decided to focus rebuilding efforts on the more than
50% of India’s population that lived in its 635,000 villages. It was a bold move since the residents of
these rural communities, with an average population of 1,000, were largely illiterate. Furthermore,
they had limited access to schools, telephones, electricity, or media.
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Critics claimed it made little sense to try boosting share in locations where HUL soap brands (Lux,
Dove, etc.) already had a market share of almost 60%. But the Lifebuoy team had data showing that
soap was used on only 20% of rural bathing occasions.4 Also, current distribution reached only 46%
of rural residents.5 Far from being saturated, they believed the growth potential was huge.
One innovative response was to recruit women as local distributors in these remote communities,
appointing them as Shakti Ammas (“strength mothers”). The company offered them training,
microcredit, and products in small pack sizes affordable to people on low incomes. These Shakti
women entrepreneurs could earn Rs. 1,000 a month or more, often doubling their household income.
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But better distribution could not solve Lifebuoy’s core problem, and in 2001 management decided
to relaunch the 107-year-old brand. In a break from tradition, they replaced the chunky carbolic brick
soap with a shaped, milled toilet bar that promised a “contemporary health fragrance” and “better
germ protection.” (See Exhibit 2.) Supported by extensive advertising, Lifebuoy was repositioned
from a male-oriented personal hygiene bar to a family health soap. Advertising and promotion were
aimed at women, and the new package featured a family on the wrapper. But price remained largely
unchanged at an economical nine Indian rupees (Rs. 9)—about $0.18—for a 125-gram bar.6
Rural Outreach through Swasthya Chetna
The company also launched a rural outreach program called Swasthya Chetna (SC) that translated
as “Health Awakening.” In addition to reaching new markets, SC aimed to reduce a major public
health problem. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), diarrhea killed 2.2 million
people every year. In India, it took the lives of 600,000 children under age five annually. Yet WHO
claimed that by washing hands properly, half of the deaths could be avoided, making handwashing
the single most cost-effective health intervention available to developing countries.
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Launched in May 2002, SC’s objective was to contact remote, media-inaccessible communities, and
grow Lifebuoy’s sales through education. With a primary target of schoolchildren, teams of trained
“health development facilitators” each visited 72 villages quarterly, delivering their scripted health
and hygiene messages through a variety of illustrated stories, visual aids, and quizzes with prizes.
No
Their most powerful tool was the “Glo-Germ” demonstration in which children rubbed white UV
powder on their hands before being told to wash them clean with only water. When they then held
their hands under an ultraviolet light, the powder glowed, showing how germs remained even when
hands looked clean. A follow-up Glo-Germ inspection of hands washed with soap verified that all
dirt and germs were removed, illustrating the central message that “visibly clean is not really clean.”
The Turnaround: Some Wins, Some Worries
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The impact of these initiatives was mixed. On the sales front, Lifebuoy’s revenues grew by 20% in
2003–2004, and the following year, by an additional 10%.7 By 2005, the brand had an 18.4% share in
the $880 million Indian personal soap market, and was again the brand leader. However, because no
price increase accompanied its relaunch, profit margins continued to decline.
The social impact of the SC rural outreach program was also initially impressive. By mid-decade,
it had reached more than 120 million people in 50,600 villages. Immediate post-visit awareness of
germs grew by 30%, and short-term soap use increased among 79% of parents and 93% of children.8
But no sustained change in handwashing habits was found, and while Lifebuoy’s brand recognition
increased, sales rose only modestly. As a result, the program’s cost significantly exceeded its returns.
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Unilever’s Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustainability Plan
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Late-Decade Reversals: New Market Challenges
Any glimmer of a turnaround was extinguished when a combination of strategic miscalculations
and market forces resulted in Lifebuoy’s renewed decline in the second half of the decade.
Serial Missteps: Repositioning and Relaunch Failures
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Buoyed by the sales boost following the 2002 relaunch, management decided to reposition the
brand again in 2005. A “Life without Fear” campaign was built around the theme that mothers need
not worry about sending their children outside to get dirty. But while the TV ads were emotionally
engaging, they failed to communicate product advantages or to motivate consumers to buy. From
2005 to 2007, Lifebuoy’s germ-protection attribute scores dropped from 59.5 to 50.5, and market share
declined from 18.4% to 17.6%.9 Meanwhile, the category was assaulted by mounting competition and
steep cost increases, particularly a 50% rise in vegetable oil prices.
The crisis led to yet another relaunch, this time based on data rather than emotions. In 2007, HUL
sponsored a clinical trial that collected evidence of the effect of handwashing on disease. A scientific
study involving 2,000 Mumbai families showed that children who practiced handwashing had 26%
fewer days of school absence, due to 25% fewer diarrhea events, 15% fewer cases of respiratory
infection, and 46% fewer eye infections.10
Excited by these findings, the HUL team used them to support a product relaunch. But it proved
difficult to communicate research results connecting soap usage to school attendance. It was simply
too big a conceptual leap for people who were unaware of the basic concept of germs, let alone the
link between germs and disease. So Lifebuoy’s market share kept falling—to 15.5% by 2009.
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Rejuvenating Lifebuoy Liquid
At about this time, a worldwide swine flu pandemic broke out, ultimately resulting in the death of
more than 18,000 people in South Asia and Africa. When public health officials began stressing the
importance of handwashing, it triggered a widespread switch from beauty bars to health soaps.
Moreover, the Lifebuoy team discovered that when consumers were assured of germ protection, they
became price insensitive. It was an important insight that the team planned to exploit.
No
Serendipitously, at this time, the Indian-based R&D team responsible for Lifebuoy was working
on a new liquid soap formulation. (In Unilever’s network of R&D centers, the Bangalore center had
global responsibilities for Lifebuoy.) As a late entrant to the fast-growing liquid handwash segment,
Lifebuoy Liquid Handwash had met with only moderate success. Responding to research showing
that the average time spent washing hands was far less than the recommended 20 to 30 seconds, the
R&D team developed a new formulation able to get hands germ free in 10 seconds.
Do
The innovation instantly caught the attention of Lifebuoy’s marketing team, and in 2010, Lifebuoy
Liquid Handwash was relaunched with a campaign highlighting its germ-killing capability. The
product was an immediate success, not only for its formulation but also its futuristic package that
became a symbol identifying homes in which it was displayed as “modern households.” However,
management knew that overtaking liquid handwash pioneer Dettol would be quite a challenge.
An Emerging Competitor: Dettol’s Challenge
Launched in India in 1933 as an antiseptic liquid, Dettol had remained focused on its first-aid
segment for half a century. But as growth stalled in the early 1980s, management extended the brand
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Unilever’s Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustainability Plan
into soap, a market 50 times larger than its original mature segment. Exploiting Dettol’s antiseptic
heritage and an instantly identifiable smell associated with hospitals, the new soap was positioned as
providing protection from germs. Its advertising slogan “Be 100% Sure” reinforced the message.
Rather than struggling to claim a share of the mass market that Lifebuoy had long dominated, this
new soap brand was launched at almost twice the price of its established competitor and soon grew
to become Dettol’s main product line. But by 2000, its market share was stagnating. To expand
beyond its established use as “a soap for special bathing occasions,” product variations were
introduced—a white soap in 2004, and a menthol soap in 2006. However, in 2007, Lifebuoy’s new
rival sent a strong signal when it vacated its traditional mid-price segment by offering a small 35gram pack for Rs. 6 (about $0.12)—clearly positioned against Lifebuoy’s 42-gram pack at Rs. 5.
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It was an unusual move for Dettol, which had always nurtured its brand equity, rarely engaging
in price or promotional competition. As a result, the brand had always been very profitable, and
despite a 5.2% market share that was less than one-third of Lifebuoy’s, it could match the leading
brand’s advertising spending. Also, unlike local competitors, Dettol was backed by Reckitt Benckiser,
its German-based parent, whose brands such as Lysol, Calgon, Woolite, and Clearasil generated sales
of $6 billion in 180 countries. Together, these elements suggested that the fast-growing liquid
handwash segment would be the arena where the two brands would soon go head-to-head.
New CEO, New Directions
In January 2009, a new CEO took charge of Unilever. The strategic and organizational changes he
introduced had an immediate impact companywide—including for Lifebuoy in India.
tC
Shaking the Tree: Instilling Discipline, Infusing Energy
When Unilever’s board appointed Paul Polman as the first outside CEO in the company’s history,
it signaled a major shakeup in its underperforming culture. The 52-year-old Dutchman was not just
an outsider, he had spent 27 years at archrival Procter & Gamble, reaching that company’s most
senior executive levels before joining Nestlé as its CFO.
No
Assuming his new Unilever role during a global recession, Polman’s actions confirmed his belief
in the motto “never waste a crisis.” In his first week, he announced that he would no longer provide
earnings guidance or publish quarterly reports. When the share price fell almost 10%, he attributed
the decline to the departure of hedge funds, a group that he felt “would sell their own grandmothers
if they thought they could make a profit.”11 When analysts queried him about the stock price drop, he
responded: “We need to know why we are here. The answer is, for consumers not shareholders. If we
are in sync with consumer needs and the environment in which we operate, and take responsibility
for society as well as our employees, then the shareholder will also be rewarded.”12
Do
To shake up a culture that was “internally focused and self-serving after years of restructuring,”13
Polman froze all salaries and cut overseas travel. Then, to implement his belief that “execution is
strategy in our business,” he installed 30-day action plans to increase the company’s speed to market
and consumer-led innovation. And, to instill discipline, he insisted all managers be held accountable.
Polman claimed that he was not just driving for short-term effect, but was positioning Unilever for
long-term growth: “It is easy for me to get tremendous results very short term, get that translated into
compensation and be off sailing in the Bahamas. But the goal for this company . . . is to follow a four
or five year process. We need to change the strategy and the structure as well as the culture.”14
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Redefining the Strategy: Committing to Sustainability
In keeping with these beliefs, the new CEO announced an ambitious goal of doubling Unilever’s
sales volume. But he also acknowledged that “growth at any cost is not viable,” and committed to
achieving this goal while decoupling growth from the company’s environmental impact. To translate
his bold vision into specific objectives, in October 2010 the company unveiled the Unilever
Sustainable Living Plan (USLP).
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USLP had three goals: to halve the environmental footprint of making and using its products, to
source 100% of its agricultural raw materials sustainably, and to help a billion people improve their
health and well-being. Polman emphasized that USLP was no mere corporate social responsibility
program, but was totally aligned with its commercial interests. It was Unilever’s core strategy built
on its long-held mission to “do well by doing good.”
As the broad goals were broken into 50 measurable objectives, management found that Unilever’s
own operations accounted for only 6%–7% of its environmental footprint. So the company committed
to taking responsibility for its entire value chain, and over the full product life cycle. For example, it
began working with tea and palm oil suppliers (responsible for a quarter of Unilever’s footprint) to
help them meet USLP’s 100% sustainable sourcing commitment. Meanwhile, on the consumption
end, product development and marketing programs began working to reduce the two-thirds of their
footprint generated by consumers’ use of Unilever products, and to increase their positive social
impact. (See Exhibit 3.)
Reshaping the Organization: New Roles, New Players
tC
In parallel, Polman continued to implement “One Unilever,” an in-process program aimed at
streamlining its complex, multilevel matrix by assigning responsibility to three regional heads and
three global category presidents. This reorganization had already shifted the power balance from
country-based Opco chairmen (who reported to the regional heads) to global brand leaders (who
reported to the category presidents). Opcos were still accountable for the profitability of their local
operations, but were now responsible for implementing strategies developed by global brand teams.
No
Building on “One Unilever,” Polman made the regional head for Asia his Chief Operating Officer
(COO), giving him responsibility for all regions. Simultaneously, the new CEO expanded the three
category divisions to four—personal care, home care, food, and refreshment—and, in a signal that
reinforced the earlier power shift, had all of them report directly to himself. (See Exhibit 4.)
With strategy in the hands of global brand leaders, Polman wanted to ensure that Unilever was
still responsive to local consumer needs, particularly in emerging markets that now accounted for
half the company’s turnover. As a result, global brand management resources and responsibilities
were now distributed worldwide, including in the developing world. For example, Lifebuoy’s Global
Brand Vice President was located in Singapore, and his global brand teams responsible for bar soaps,
liquids, and social mission were based in Mumbai, Singapore, and Nairobi, respectively.
Do
Through all this, Polman insisted that USLP targets be embedded in all key business decisions.
“This is at the core of our business strategy,” he said. “It’s not a separate CSR agenda. We believe that
responsible companies that make contributions to society a central part of their business model will
be successful.” So while most managers’ incentive compensation was still tied primarily to financial
objectives, USLP targets were monitored and independently audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC) and were reported in detail through the company’s management reporting system.
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Lifebuoy Rebooted: New Players, New Priorities
As part of the restructuring, Samir Singh was appointed as Lifebuoy’s Global Brand VP with a
mandate to revitalize this iconic brand that had now retreated to a few developing countries and was
struggling in several of them, including India. Singh, a 12-year company veteran with extensive
brand management experience, soon built a team and defined a strategy to drive Lifebuoy’s renewal.
Defining a Global Strategy: Reclaiming the Heritage
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The new global team’s first priority was to complete what Singh called “an archaeological review”
of Lifebuoy’s past successes and problems. Concluding that the core of the problems lay in Lifebuoy’s
history of continual reinvention, repositioning, and relaunch, Singh decided to return the brand to its
roots—offering protection from diseases spread by germs. The first element of the strategy was to
educate consumers on the consequences of germs by assuring mothers that Lifebuoy provided their
families superior protection from 10 infections from flu to diarrhea. (See Exhibit 5.)
Next, marketing efforts focused on “hot spots”—times of the year such as monsoon season, school
re-entry, or crowded religious festivals when infection risk was high. Tailored messages reassured
mothers that Lifebuoy could help protect their family at these times of high anxiety. The advertising
and promotional activities were customized to each country’s specific calendar of hot-spot events as
well as its competitive situation and stage of hygiene development.
Finally, these activities were supported by a program of product development that resulted in
innovations such as Clinicare 10, a premium product claiming germ protection 10 times better than
any other soap, and Lifebuoy Color Changing Handwash aimed at encouraging children to wash
their hands for a full 10 seconds, at which time the soap changed color.
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The approach proved successful, and from 2009 to 2012, Lifebuoy’s global sales increased by 17%
per annum (p.a.), and gross profit by 22% p.a. Indeed, Singh’s boss became so confident that his fiveyear plan forecast that Lifebuoy’s global sales would surge from €408 million in 2010 to become a €1
billion brand by 2015. But Polman’s rollout of USLP presented an even more difficult goal. With all
Unilever brands expected to contribute to the USLP objectives, Singh volunteered Lifebuoy to assume
the main role in fulfilling the global health and hygiene target. And because India was Lifebuoy’s
largest market, the Indian team would need to make a significant contribution.
No
Integrating the Social Mission: Beyond Pilots to Performance
When Singh was appointed Lifebuoy’s Global Brand VP, Dr. Myriam Sidibe joined his team as
Global Brand Director, Social Mission. A world expert on the public health impact of handwashing,
Sidibe had been recruited to the corporate office in 2006 as Lifebuoy’s Global Partnership Manager. In
that role, she had become the champion of handwash behavior-change programs, initiating
numerous activities, including the Mumbai clinical trial that led to India’s 2008 product relaunch.
Do
In their discussions, Singh suggested that while Sidibe’s campaigning had inspired many new
initiatives, the high cost of her “pristine” forms of handwash programs had slowed implementation
and limited transferability. Stressing his belief that Lifebuoy’s social mission must be fully aligned
with its commercial interests, he challenged her to take her behavior-change initiatives beyond
clinical studies, conferences, and pilots and focus on leveraging her exciting research results into
commercially viable programs that would open up new market segments for the brand.
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On her part, Sidibe urged Singh to make the goal of reaching a billion people with handwashing
programs a strategic priority. She explained that when she was in her corporate partnership role, she
had publicly committed Lifebuoy to this target in support of the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals, aligning her pledge with the UN goals’ 2015 target date.
Others were concerned, however. They told Singh that the 1 billion USLP goal had been set for
Unilever’s entire product line, not just Lifebuoy. And they pointed out that USLP targets had a 2020
time horizon, not a 2015 target. But Singh decided to embrace Sidibe’s commitment: “I’d rather set a
goal of a billion for 2015 and ‘fail’ by only reaching 650 million than take on a safe 100 million target
for 2020 and over-deliver with 200 million,” he said. “Only bold stretching goals generate passion.”
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It was a brave decision. Singh knew that USLP targets were closely monitored by PwC, and that
results were not only tracked by top management but were also highlighted in Unilever’s annual
report as well as in its widely circulated annual USLP report. Both documents provided information
and presented data that was explicit and detailed—celebrating achievements, identifying shortfalls,
and outlining proposed adjustments and corrective action.
Selling the Strategy: Engaging Operating Companies
In late 2010, Singh convened a workshop in Jakarta to which he invited brand directors from all
Opcos with large Lifebuoy sales to identify the most effective ways to meet the brand’s USLP target.
In open sessions, they shared models, compared costs, quantified benefits, and identified what
worked. In the end, two programs attracted the most interest: an Indonesian partnership program
built on “training the trainer,” and an Indian multibrand rural outreach initiative. With credibility
that he had built through the sales and profit turnaround, Singh was now ready to ask the Opcos to
invest in these projects.
tC
In early 2011, with the endorsement of the Cleansing Category SVP (Singh’s boss) and Unilever’s
Chief Operating Officer (the Opco chairmen’s boss), Singh took his USLP business case to a meeting
of Opco chairmen. Conceding that previous handwashing behavior-change programs had struggled,
he assured them that these two models were worth investing in. Without disrupting existing
programs, he suggested that they take them on as pilots, funding them by reinvesting some of the
enhanced profits generated by the brand’s recent turnaround.
No
Because India accounted for almost half of Lifebuoy’s global sales, Singh was gratified that HUL’s
chairman became a strong supporter of his proposal. Although subsequent discussions within the
Indian Opco revealed pockets of skepticism and even some resistance, he was confident that the
support of Unilever’s top man in the country would allow his global brand team to implement their
agenda. And HUL’s local Lifebuoy team would need that help: they had been allocated 450 million of
the 1 billion USLP behavior-change target.
Implementation in India: Reviewing the Options
Do
When Singh offered to help the Indian team implement the two Jakarta models, Sudir Sitapati,
HUL’s Category Manager for Lifebuoy in India, told him he had a third model to consider.
The First Option: The KKD Rural Outreach Initiative
One of the models endorsed in Jakarta was based on a rural program first launched in India in
2010. It emerged as a replacement for the SC “Health Awakening” program that had petered out due
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Unilever’s Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustainability Plan
to its unacceptable payback of almost 10 years compared to the Unilever norm of one to three years to
recoup marketing expenses. The innovative Khushiyon Ki Doli (KKD)—or “Caravan of Happiness”—
was a collaborative, multibrand, rural outreach effort in which brand managers for Surf detergent,
Close Up toothpaste, Sunsilk shampoo, Vim dishwashing liquid, and Lifebuoy soap pooled resources
to create a direct contact program to reach remote rural villages with all their products.
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KKD involved teams visiting villages and hosting meetings at which all sponsoring products were
presented. Lifebuoy’s KKD component was a scaled-back version of its SC routine, retaining the
“Glo-Germ” demonstration but focusing on housewives rather than children. Supported by videos,
games, and prizes, the presentations were received enthusiastically by residents of these media-dark
villages. Later, promoters went door-to-door with coupons and offers, while other team members
ensured prominent product placement at village shops.
The Second Option: The MP Partnership Initiative
The second program endorsed in Jakarta was the Indonesian partnership program, a clinically
proven 21-day intervention built on the Unilever Handwashing Program that Sidibe and her codevelopers had published as “Five Levers for Change.” (See Exhibit 6.) Lifebuoy Indonesia had
integrated this scientifically based behavior model into a national schools program in partnership
with the Indonesian government and some NGOs. The program trained teachers and provided them
with tools to deliver the behavior change in their schools. It then leveraged that impact by requiring
each teacher to cascade the program to three other schools.
tC
With the endorsement of HUL’s chairman, Singh had convinced Sitapati to sign an agreement
with UNICEF to bring a similar handwashing program to Madhya Pradesh (MP), an extremely poor
Indian state with a literacy rate of 80% for males and 60% for females.15 Under the agreement, HUL
would create the materials, deliver the training, provide the soap, and manage the evaluation
process; the MP government would provide school access and support; and UNICEF would print
activity kits and link the partners. As a condition of its support, however, the MP government
insisted that the training and materials could not be branded with Lifebuoy’s name.
No
This pilot program would adapt Indonesia’s proven “School of Five” materials for the 900,000
children initially targeted in 5,700 government schools. Implementation would conform with the
“five non-negotiables” of Sidibe’s change program: the four key phases of behavior change—
awareness, commitment, reinforcement, and reward—all applied over a 21-day program, the fifth
key element.
The Third Option: The Urban Schools Liquids Initiative
While Sitapati was ready to consider expanding these two programs in 2013, he also wanted to
offer a third option. He felt that Lifebuoy Liquid Handwash had the potential to change behavior
while also boosting revenue and profits. Arguing that liquid soap had a higher usage rate, and
potentially a much higher margin, in 2011 he had launched a new urban schools liquids initiative.
Do
Like KKD, this program was designed primarily as a marketing initiative, but differed from KKD
on several dimensions: it was focused solely on Lifebuoy, not on multiple products; it was aimed at
urban markets rather than rural locations; it targeted children not housewives; and most critically, its
objective was to increase the use of Lifebuoy Liquid Handwash rather than Lifebuoy soap bars.
To implement the program, Indonesia’s “School of Five” educational program was adapted for
urban schools by employing interactive games, songs, dances, and the classic Glo-Germ demon9
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Unilever’s Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustainability Plan
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stration. Because children found the use of a pump more fun, they washed their hands more
frequently. And as School of Five research had shown, they took the lessons home and influenced the
handwashing behavior of the whole household.
The Decision: Singh’s Balancing Act
In early 2013, Singh was pleased that Lifebuoy’s three-year 17% average annual growth rate not
only made it Unilever’s fastest-growing brand, but also outpaced Dettol’s growth for the first time.
But he worried that its handwash program had only reached 119 million people globally. If Lifebuoy
was to achieve its 1 billion USLP target, India would have to step up to the challenge.
op
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Lifebuoy India’s Achievements—and Shortfalls
Lifebuoy’s excellent global performance had been greatly helped by strong growth in India, its
largest market. (See Exhibit 7.) But despite strong recovery in sales and profitability, handwashing
behavior-change programs in India had reached just 17 million people in 2012, taking its total to 47
million since 2010. While impressive, the performance was well below the trajectory necessary to
achieve the country’s allocated behavior-change target of 450 million by 2015.
tC
Singh knew that Sitapati also had to meet HUL financial objectives, and accepted that most of his
advertising and promotion (A&P) budget would be allocated to media expenditure, typically with a
payback of one to three years. Nonetheless, since 2010 Sitapati had boosted the share of A&P budget
that he allotted to behavior-change programs from zero to 5%. Singh felt that such programs offered a
great opportunity to reach the 40% of the population in media-dark locations unreachable by
traditional broadcast or print media. For this reason, he hoped that Sitapati would at least double the
behavior-change A&P percentage. But because the payback on these programs was three or four
times that of traditional marketing outlays, it was a tough sell. (See Exhibit 8.)
Evaluating Progress, Focusing Investments:
As the team discussed the three behavior-change options, different perspectives emerged:
No
In its first two years, KKD had reached 25 million people in 70,000 villages, with research
showing that soap consumption increased by 8% following a KKD visit. In rural Utter Pradesh, after
two years of KKD visits, Lifebuoy’s market share increased from 13.9% to 15.6%. While the cost per
contact had fallen to Rs. 6 (about $0.10), Sitapati was concerned that as KKD moved to smaller, more
remote villages, such visits were now becoming decreasingly cost effective.
Do
Singh’s global team was more concerned that brief KKD Lifebuoy demonstrations to housewives
were not resulting in sustainable behavior change that would satisfy the PwC auditors. To ensure
that KKD estimates counted towards India’s 450 million target, Sidibe’s team was helping add a
school component to KKD visits and the “five non-negotiables” into its presentations. But as Sitapati
noted, such efforts further slowed KKD’s delivery and increased its cost.
In 2013, for Rs. 54.5 million (about $780,000), KKD could bring its handwashing message to 8.5
million people. But it would take Lifebuoy India 8.6 years to break even on the investment. Sitapati
had marketing investments that would yield much higher returns much faster.
Although Sitapati knew that the MP Partnership would be time consuming, with a long payback
period, he was willing to consider it as a pilot. But he was troubled that it would reach only 900,000
10
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[email protected] or 617.783.7860
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Unilever’s Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustainability Plan
children. He also worried about relying on external funding, and was unhappy about delivering it as
an unbranded program. Finally, he felt that 13.5 years was just far too long a payback period.
The global brand team was more excited. Because studies proved that training made children
effective change agents who could influence family behavior, they estimated that 900,000 kids could
change the behavior of 4.5 million people. Moreover, the team believed that a successful pilot could
lead to the program’s adoption by all 47 MP districts, and eventually by other Indian states. The huge
potential impact of rolling out this program across India had led Singh to initiate negotiations with a
potential new funding partner that could significantly leverage this important initiative.
op
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The Urban Schools Liquids program targeted 25 cities with a population of 1 million or more
where liquid soap had achieved 7% to 10% penetration, and where Sitapati hoped to build brand
preference for Lifebuoy. Although India’s total liquid handwash market was only about $65
million—5% of the total personal soap market—it was growing at up to 40% annually.
While Singh accepted that education was also valuable to urban populations, he was concerned
that liquids were too expensive for the poor rural mass market that was the target of behavior
change, and worried that the initiative would distract the organization’s attention. But knowing that
the brand had to be profitable in order to support its ambitious handwash programs, he had agreed
to support the urban schools initiative if implemented, and his team had offered to help integrate
“the five non-negotiables” into the design.
Although the program was expected to reach only 1.5 million people, Sitapati believed the higher
margins of liquid handwash would translate into a payback period of 3.5 years—not as good as
alternative marketing investments, but the most attractive of the behavior-change options.
tC
***
Do
No
It was a complex decision with important implications both locally and globally. In India, Sitapati
would have to decide which, if any, of these three behavior-change projects he should include in his
Indian budget; in Singapore, Singh had to decide whether to intervene in the decision, and if so, how;
and in London, Polman would be considering whether this tension reflected the shift in strategic
process he had envisioned when he introduced his USLP goals.
11
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[email protected] or 617.783.7860
No
Total employees
$34.32
$28.79
18,886.7
9,990.3
2,966.1
35
42
92
$39.45
$30.87
16,443.0
9,727.7
2,997.8
35
43
94
165
29
40
96
$32.29
$25.75
17,232.1
9,479.0
2,879.4
$2.02
$1.96
$1.11
206
41
47
118
$23.58
$20.23
13,508.2
7,648.7
2,791.7
$1.53
$1.48
$0.78
45,488.0
17,697.2
15,611.2
12,179.6
3,950.5
(758.1)
4,461.0
(2,136.9)
3,884.3
2005
295
80
39
176
308
101
29
178
$11.47
$9.91
15,807.0
3,406.4
2,831.8
$0.77
$0.75
$0.28
2,066.3
(361.4)
2,325.4
(970.7)
2,277.7
45,651.4
1995
$7.43
$5.55
13,434.7
3,394.9
39,620.0
24,169.0
8,247.0
7,204.0
3,650.0
2,081.0
(3,172.0)
2,138.4
Researcher: E. McCaffrey, Baker Research Services
1990
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-12-
304
114
35
155
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$19.02
$11.86
16,537.7
12,273.2
2,820.4
$0.34
$0.33
$0.43
44,694.7
17,816.1
27,790.8
16,640.6
1,239.9
1,037.9
(1,320.7)
996.2
2000
Source: Capital IQ, ThomsonOne (accessed 4/29/14) and company financial statements.
169
$1.9
$1.84
$1.21
$2.04
$1.98
$1.25
172
60,366.4
17,529.1
19,812.9
23,024.4
5,834.4
5,352.4
(3,228.3)
5,519.7
59,352.3
17,753.9
19,526.7
22,071.7
6,165.6
5,690.9
(3,115.0)
5,693.5
2010
op
yo
2011
67,669.6
18,299.2
22,530.2
26,840.3
6,376.2
5,759.1
(3,558.6)
5,758.7
tC
2012
Unilever Financial Performance, 1990–2012 ($ millions)
Unilever
Revenues
Europe
Americas
Developing Countries
Earnings from continuing operations
Loss from discontinued operations
Net earnings
Dividends declared
Earned on average shareholder's equity
Per share: (US$)
Net earnings
Net earnings-diluted
Dividends declared
Stock price range (US$)
High
Low
Total assets of continuing operations (Current assets)
Long-term borrowings
Shares outstanding-average (in thousands)
Employees at year-end: (in thousands)
Europe
Americas
Developing Countries
Exhibit 1
Do
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Source:
Exhibit 2
Unilever internal company document.
tC
No
Lifebuoy’s Indian Relaunch, February 2002
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[email protected] or 617.783.7860
Unilever’s Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustainability Plan
Exhibit 3
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Unilever Sustainable Living Program (USLP): Original Targets 2010
Press Release:
Unilever announces plans to decouple future growth from environmental impact.
Global firm announces plans to:
•
•
•
halve the environmental footprint of its products
help 1 billion people improve their health and wellbeing
source 100% of its agricultural raw materials sustainably
op
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At the launch of Unilever’s Sustainable Living Plan, announced simultaneously in London, Rotterdam,
New Delhi and New York, CEO Paul Polman explained: “We have ambitious plans to grow the company.
But growth at any price is not viable. We have to develop new ways of doing business which will ensure
that our growth does not come at the expense of the world’s diminishing natural resources.”
He also announced plans to help over 1 billion people take action to improve their health and
wellbeing, mostly in developing countries, over the next 10 years.
The Sustainable Living Plan sets out over 50 social, economic and environmental targets. It will see
Unilever, whose global brands include Dove, Omo, Knorr and Lipton, halve the greenhouse gas emissions,
water and waste used not just by the company in its direct operations, but also by its suppliers and
consumers.
Over two-thirds of greenhouse gas emissions and half the water used in Unilever products’ lifecycle
come from consumer use, so this is a major commitment on an unprecedented scale…
Other key goals Unilever plans to achieve by or before 2020 include:
sourcing 100% of its agricultural raw materials sustainably including, by 2015, 100% sustainable
palm oil;
•
changing the hygiene habits of 1 billion people in Asia, Africa and Latin America so that they
wash their hands with Lifebuoy soap at key times during the day—helping to reduce diarrhoeal
disease, the world’s second biggest cause of infant mortality;
•
making safe drinking water available to half a billion people by extending sales of low-cost inhome water purifier, Pureit, from India to other countries;
•
improving livelihoods in developing countries by working with Oxfam, Rainforest Alliance and
others to link over 500,000 smallholder farmers and small-scale distributors into its supply chain.
No
tC
•
Commenting that Unilever wants to be sustainable ‘in every sense of the word’, Polman said: “There
are billions of people who want the improvements to their health and wellbeing and who want to live
sustainably. Our aim is to help people in developing countries improve their quality of life without a big
increase in their environmental impacts, and to help those in developed markets maintain a good standard
of living while reducing theirs.”
Do
Paul Polman sees no conflict between Unilever achieving its sustainability goals and growing its
business. “We are already finding that tackling sustainability challenges provides new opportunities for
sustainable growth: it creates preference for our brands, builds business with our retail customers, drives
our innovation, grows our markets and, in many cases, generates cost savings.”
Polman emphasised that Unilever did not have all the answers and that the company would need to
work in partnership with customers, suppliers, governments and NGOs if it was to achieve its goals.
Source:
Unilever press release, November 15, 2010.
14
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Casewriter’s construction from company documents.
Exhibit 4
Source:
tC
No
Unilever Corporate Organization Structure
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[email protected] or 617.783.7860
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Source:
Exhibit 5
Unilever internal company document.
tC
No
Lifebuoy Core Claim: Protection against Germs
op
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[email protected] or 617.783.7860
Exhibit 6
Unilever Behavior-Change Model
FIVE LEVERS FOR CHANGE
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Unilever’s Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustainability Plan
Lifebuoy has used Unilever’s Five Levers for Change methodology to develop a series of
interventions to ensure that people understand why handwashing with soap is important. The model
sets out five principles, which, if applied to behaviour change interventions, will have a positive and
lasting impact.
LEVER 1: MAKE IT UNDERSTOOD
op
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Visibly Clean Not Necessarily Clean: One key element of Lifebuoy’s behaviour change approach
is the ‘glo-germ’ demonstration. This counters the common misconception that ‘visibly clean’ is
‘hygienically clean’. When held under ultra-violet light, ‘glo-germ’ powder illuminates the germs left
behind on hands washed only with water. This makes it clearly understood that handwashing with
soap provides greater protection against germs than washing with water alone.
LEVER 2: MAKE IT EASY
Mother and Child Interaction: As part of our programmes we encourage interaction between
children and their mothers. This helps to ensure that new habits start and stick. For example with our
school programmes, mothers play a role in tracking their child’s handwashing compliance via a daily
sticker chart. This is important in helping to reinforce the behaviour in the home environment as well
as at school.
LEVER 3: MAKE IT DESIRABLE
No
tC
Pledging: Studies show that people who commit to a future action in public are more likely to
deliver on this commitment. Our school programme uses the Classroom Soap Pledge, where children
pledge to wash their hands on the five occasions that matter, for the duration of the programme. This
is done in class so that peer pressure and teacher approval makes the behaviour more likely. The use
of aspirational comic book characters in our schools programmes and local celebrities in our
campaigns is also key. When well-known celebrities emphasise the importance of handwashing with
soap for a healthy nation, people are encouraged to practise the habit and emulate the behaviour of
people they admire.
LEVER 4: MAKE IT REWARDING
Positive Reinforcement: Lifebuoy understands the power of the positive influences to motivate
social change. Positive reinforcement runs throughout the school programme—a strong rewards
system makes mothers and children feel good for taking positive steps in changing their habits.
LEVER 5: MAKE IT A HABIT
Do
21 Days Practice: Habits build up over time through repetitive behaviour. This is why practising
handwashing with soap for a minimum of 21 days is a critical element in our programmes. Our
classroom materials—comic books, posters, quizzes and songs—all work over 21 days to remind
students about the message of handwashing at key occasions. A 21-day compliance diary is also used
to record handwashing behaviour over the course of the intervention.
Source:
Company document, “Unilever’s Five Levers for Change.”
17
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[email protected] or 617.783.7860
Unilever’s Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustainability Plan
Exhibit 7
Lifebuoy India P&L: 2006 to 2012 (€ thousands)
2007
2008
125,191
88,271
136,658
9.2%
97,879
166,424
21.8%
123,062
Gross Margin
36,920
38,779
43,363
Gross Margin %
29.5%
28.4%
26.1%
8,693
8,438
9,698
28,227
30,341
33,664
Turnover
Growth %
Supply Chain Costs
Advertising and Promotion
Profit Before Overheads
PBO %
2009
2010
2011
2012
162,266
-2.5%
127,638
169,751
4.6%
127,063
189,855
11.8%
158,149
238,629
25.7%
188,832
34,628
42,688
31,705
49,798
21.3%
25.1%
16.7%
20.9%
15,157
13,945
13,536
17,199
19,471
28,744
18,169
32,598
16.9%
9.6%
13.7%
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2006
Source:
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914-417
22.5%
22.2%
20.2%
12.0%
Unilever internal company documents (all data disguised).
Exhibit 8
Lifebuoy Behavior-Change Program Options: 2013 Projected Costing (values in Rs.)
2013 Program Parameters
KKD
Outreach
MP
Partnership
Urban
Liquids
Assumptions/Comments
(All values in Indian Rupees)
8,500,000
4,500,000
1,500,000
54,500,000
28,000,000
35,000,000
6.4
6.2
23.3
25,250,000
8,285,000
19,800,000
6,312,500
2,071,250
9,900,000
Investment Payback for
Lifebuoy
8.6 years
13.5 years
3.5 years
Investment Payback for
Unilever
5.7 years
8.9 years
3.5 years
tC
Estimated number of
contacts in 2013
Total Program Cost for
Lifebuoy (in Rs.)
Cost per Contact (in Rs.)
No
Incremental Lifebuoy
Revenue (in Rs.)
Do
Gross Margin (in Rs.)
Source:
Internal documents (all data disguised).
Note:
Exchange rate January 2013: 70 INR = €1.
KKD and MP usage impact assume that
they both influence family behavior,
justifying an X5 multiplier.
Lifebuoy’s Share of costs (KKD: 20%;
MP: 33%; Urban Liquid: 100%.)
Post-program soap consumption
assumptions: Lifebuoy obtains 30% of
forecast post-KKD increase; 20% of
post-MP’s increase (due to unbranded
soap); Urban Liquids program converts
12% of households to Lifebuoy
Handwash averaging Rs. 110 use p.a.
25% for bar soap; 50% for liquid.
Post-KKD and MP programs, Unilever
retains 45% rural market share for its
soap brands.
18
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Endnotes
1 HUL, 2001 Annual Report, page XXI.
2 “A Fresh Lease of Lifebuoy?,” Business Standard, February 25, 2002.
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Unilever’s Lifebuoy in India: Implementing the Sustainability Plan
3 “HLL Uses Health Card to Push Lifebuoy Sales in Rural Areas,” Business Standard, October 25, 2002.
4 HUL, 2001 Annual Report, page XXI.
5 HUL, “Repositioning Strengthens Lifebuoy’s 107-Year Heritage,” press release 312, 2002.
6 “HLL Relaunches Lifebuoy, Eyes Healthy Sales Numbers,” Business Standard, February 13, 2002.
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7 “Lifebuoy Swasthya Chetna: Unilever's Social Marketing Campaign,” ICFAI Case Study MKTG/147, 2006.
8 “Lifebuoy – Swasthya Chetna,” posted by bsaikrishna on October 3, 2010, Brandalyzer,
http://brandalyzer.wordpress.com/2010/10/03/lifebuoy-swasthya-chetna/, accessed May 18, 2013.
9 Shailesh Oururani, “The Lifebuoy Story: Repositioning of a Brand,” November 3, 2012,
http://www.slideshare.net/shaileshgururani/lifebuoy-15005646.
10 “Sustainable Living: Handwashing Behavior Change,” http://www.unilever.com/sustainable-
living/healthandhygiene/handwashing/handwashingbehaviourchange/index.aspx, accessed July 13, 2013.
11 “Sustainable Living: Handwashing Behavior Change.”
12 Andrew Saunders, “The MT Interview: Paul Polman of Unilever,” Management Today, March 1, 2011.
13 Andrew Saunders, “The MT Interview: Paul Polman of Unilever.”
14 Stefan Stern, “Outsider in a hurry to shake up Unilever,” Financial Times, April 4, 2010.
Do
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15 United Nations Development Program, “Madhya Pradesh: Economic and Human Development Indicators,”
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/india/docs/madhyapradesh_factsheet.pdf.
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